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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Corporations-Stockholder's Action for Declaration of DividendsFailure to Join Directors
One of the problems facing a stockholder wishing to bring a suit for
the declaration of dividends has been to find a forum in which the suit
could be brought. In the past such a suit required that a majority of
the directors be made parties defendant.1 With the advent of huge
corporations this became an almost impossible task, since it was likely
that the board of directors would be made up of men from various
states. It has been suggested that suits prosecuted against the directors
in their various jurisdictions, holding all of the judgments in abeyance
until the final judgment was secured, would produce the desired results. 2 The multiplicity of suits involved, however, makes this plan
undesirable.. The only alternative, waiting until all of the directors are
assembled within one jurisdiction, and then obtaining service of process
before they escape, is too uncertain to be practicable.
In Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp.,3 a solution was laid down
which is simple and shows the modem bench's ability to provide a
method whereby the ends of justice may be served. Action was brought
by the plaintiff, a minority stockholder and a resident of New York,
to compel the declaration and payment of accumulated dividends on
preferred stock. The federal court decided the case on Delaware law
When the suit
as it would be interpreted by a Pennsylvania court.
was first instituted against the corporation, none of the directors were
named as parties defendant; but upon the ruling of the district court
that a majority of the board of directors were indispensable parties,
three of the twelve members were served. The plaintiff claimed that
there was no one state or federal jurisdiction in which a majority could
be served. The district court held that the action could go no further
without personal jurisdiction over a majority of the 'directors.5 It was
alleged, and for the purposes of this appeal taken to be true, that 92
per cent of the no-par common shares were held by four large users 6
of the corporation's products. Also outstanding were 100,000 shares of
$6.00 cumulative preferred no-par stock. Dividend arrearages on the
cumulative preferred no-par stock amounted to $57.75 per share when
1

BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS §234 (Rev. ed. 1946); 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §5326 (Perm. ed. 1932).
2Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F. 2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947); see 61 HARV. L.
REv. 1253 (1948).
8 179 F. 2d 760 (3rd Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 70 Sup. Ct. 1026 (1950); see
98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 753 (1950).
'The corporation, with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, was
incorporated under the laws of Delaware.
"Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 9 F. R. D. 273 (E. D. Pa. 1949).
'American Steel Foundries Corporation, 38.339o%; Baldwin Locomotive Works,
33.37%; American Locomotive Company, 13.149o; and Pullman Incorporated,
8.54%.
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the complaint was filed. The corporation was in excellent financial
condition. 7 In holding that the directors were not indispensable parties
to the action, the court of appeals stated that a judgment against the
corporation compelling the payment of dividends could be enforced by
a judgment against the property of the corporation.
An action for the declaration of dividends is of an equitable nature.8
In general, the courts will not interfere with the discretion of the directors in declaring dividends, 9 but there may be a contractual relationship
which will strictly limit this 'discretion.' 0 A corporation, however, is
operated for the benefit of the stockholders; when there is an abuse of
this discretion (i.e., the directors act in bad faith, through fraudulent
motives, or for the benefit of others than the stockholders as a whole)
a court of equity will compel the directors to declare a dividend." In
the past the action has been thought of, erroneously it seems, as one in
personam against the directors for misconduct. 12 The duty co-relative
to the stockholder's right rests on the corporation rather than on the
directors as individuals. A noted text writer, in pointing out that the
action is neither derivative nor for a wrong done to the corporation,
states that the right to be enforced is against the corporation. 8 The
wrong in failing to declare dividends is that of the corporation, acting
as it must, through its board of directors, which serves most nearly in
the capacity of principal, and consequently as the alter ego of the
4
corporation.1
Is the judgment for a stated sum in the form of "judgment dividends" collectible from the corporation 'directly as in the case of a
creditor? The scant authority seems to be in disagreement. A nega7On December 31, 1947, the corporation had a net worth of $28,000,165; a
capital surplus of $4,133,449; an earned surplus of $13,410,080; net current assets
of $12,114,409; and a ratio of current assets to current liabilities of seven to one.
I BALLENTiNE, CORPORATIONS §234 (Rev. ed. 1946); 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §5326 (Perm. ed. 1932) ; 10 ROCKY MOUNTArN L. REV. 201 (1938).
' Crocker v. Waltham Watch Co., 315 Mass. 397, 53 N. E. 2d 230 (1944);

BALLENTINE, CORPORATIrOS §232 (Rev. ed. 1946); 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §5325 (Perm. ed. 1932).

" New England Trust Co. v. Penobscot Chemical Fiber Co., 50 A. 2d 188
(Me. 1946).

"2Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N. W. 668 (1919).

" Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F. 2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947); Dodge v. Ford

Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N. W. 668 (1919); NY PA NJ Utilities Co. v.

Public Service Commission, 23 F. Supp. 313 (1938).
" BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS §234 (Rev. ed. 1946) (in same section writer
also states that directors should be joined as parties defendant).
1, See BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS §42 (Rev. ed. 1946).
The courts in analogous situations have held the corporation liable for crimes and torts committed
through its agents. Crimes: Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 32 Colo. 263,

75 P. 924 (1904) ; State v. Salisbury Ice & Fuel Co., 166 N. C. 366, 81 S. E. 689
(1914); State v. The Rowland Lumber Co., 153 N. C. 610, 69 S. E. 58 (1910).
Torts: Nims v. Mt. Hermon Boys School, 160 Mass. 177, 35 N. E. 776 (1893);
Hairston v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 220 N. C. 642, 18 S. E. 2d 166 (1942).
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tive answer can be inferred from those cases requiring that directors be
joined as parties defendant. 15 The Kroese case holds it collectible from
the corporation, 16 pointing out, analogously, that when a creditor receives a judgment, some action is required by the board of directors,
officers, or agents of the corporation if it is to comply with the judgment. These acts, however, such as passing a resolution for the payment of the debt, entering payment on the corporate books, and the
physical tendering of payment, are purely ministerial. Such ministerial
acts do not render the judgment more valid. If the ministerial acts are
not performed, the judgment creditor can issue an execution, levy the
same upon and sell the property of the corporation to the same extent
as if it were a natural person. 17 In like respect if the directors failed to
perform the proper ministerial acts necessary to declaring dividends, the
stockholder could, through equity, sequester the property of the corporation or have a receiver appointed to carry out the judgment of the
court.18 It is not clear from the instant case whether each stockholder
could obtain a judgment against the corporation for his share of dividends in the event the directors failed to declare a dividend as a result
of the court's judgment. If the directors failed to declare a dividend,
the appointment of a receiver would eliminate a multiplicity of suits,
and thus best carry out the judgment of the court.
Indispensable parties are those whose interests are such that no decree can be rendered which will not affect them, and therefore the court
cannot proceed until they are brought in.1 9 The directors are not indispensable parties to an action for a declaration of dividends. They are
required to take no formal action whatsoever in compliance with the
judgment of the court. The judgment is sufficient to establish the rights
of the stockholder to dividends.
One other case, Schuckman v. Rubenstein,2° has been decided on this
same point.21 Only two of the nine members of the board of directors
15 See

Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F. 2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947); Gesell v.

Tomahawk Land Co., 184 Wis. 537, 200 N. W. 550 (1924) ; NY PA NJ Utilities
Public Service Commission, 23 F. Supp. 313 (1938).
Co.1 v.
8

"The duty of a corporation to pay dividends then and there has been imposed by the judgment of the court.... The situation becomes in substance the
same as that in which any corporate creditor sues the enterprise in the corporate
name to recover from it what it owes him...." Kroese v. General Steel Castings
Corp., 179 F. 2d 760, 764 (3rd Cir. 1950).
21 10 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §4741
(Perm. ed 1932).
Castings Corp., 179 F. 2d 760 (3rd Cir. 1950).
28 Kroese v. General Steel
19
American Ins. Co. v. Bradley Mining Co., 57 F. Supp. 545 (N. D. Cal.
1944); MacBryde v. Burnett, 41 F. Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1941); McRanie v.
Palmer, 2 F. R. D. 479 (D. Mass. 1942) ; MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE
See FED. R. CIv. P. 19 (b); 3
AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES §209 (1929).
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2150 (2d ed. 1948).
'0 164 F. 2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947).
"' Three other cases, while not decided on this same point, raise this question.
O'Neall Co. v. O'Neall, 108 Ind. App. 116, 25 N. E. 2d 656 (1940) (action to
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were properly before the court. The court held that at least a majority
of the board of directors were indispensable parties defendant. By dictum, however, the court indicated that the plaintiff might have a good
cause of action against the corporation alone to recover dividends already declared without the joining of a majority of the board of directors. This indicates that once the discretion of the directors has been
exercised and dividends declared, the courts can then enter a judgment
against the corporation for the payment of the declared dividends. Their
reasoning is based on the rule that it is within the discretion of the
directors to declare dividends; and they must, therefore, be before the
court in order that a judgment can be entered compelling them to declare dividends. This fails to consider one of the arguments in the
Kroese case that the court in declaring dividends in a proper case replaces the discretionary action of the directors with the judgment of the
court.
In North Carolina, the situation is somewhat different from that of
the principal case because the statute regulating the declaration of dividends 22 requires that a stockholder first apply to the directors for a
declaration of dividends, and if refused, an action of mandamus will lie.
by the
It must be alleged that such an application was made and refused
28
statute.
the
under
relief
grant
will
court
the
before
directors
It is interesting to note that the objections2 to ordering the declaration of dividends without a majority of the -directors present as parties
defendant do not arise in North Carolina. The North Carolina court
has said in regard to the declaration of dividends that, "By virtue of the
statute there is no discretion in the board of directors with respect to
the performance of this duty. ' '25 And yet, in Southern Mills, Inc. v.
Armnstrong,2 6 the court reached substantially the same result as those
recover dividends on stock held in one man corporation; held, failure to object in
time to lack of directors as parties constituted a waiver). Jones v. Van Heusen
Charles Co., 230 App. Div. 694, 24o N. Y. S. 204 (1930) (plaintiff brought stockholder's representative action to compel payment of dividends and for the mismanagement and misconduct of directors; held, the corporation, officers, and
directors must be named as defendants). Gesell v. Tomahawk Land Co., 184
Wis. 537, 200 N. W. 550 (1924) (demurrer to complaint was sustained because
it did not establish propriety of compelling dividend and on further ground that
directors
were not made defendants).
2
N. C. GEN. STAT. §55-115 (1943).

"Winstead v. Hearne Bros. & Co., 173 N. C. 606, 92 S. E. 613 (1917).
2 Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F. 2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333
U. S. 875 (1948) (court cannot declare dividend; therefore action is in personam
against members of the board) ; NY PA NJ Utilities Co. v. Public Service Commission, 23 F. Supp. 313 (1938) (suit against directors for misconduct) ; Gesell v.
Tomahawk Land Co., 184 Wis. 537, 200 N. W. 550 (1924) (because declaration
of dividends is within good-faith discretion of directors, they are entitled to be
heard).
" Cannon v. Wiscassett Mills Co., 195 N. C. 119, 123, 141 S. E. 344, 346
(1928).
20223 N. C. 495, 27 S. E. 2d 281 (1943).
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cases prior to the principal case. In the Southern Mills case, the plaintiff company brought an action for mandamus, mandatory injunction or
other appropriate relief, naming the corporation and the three directors
as defendants. Service on the two non-resident directors was by publication which was held to be insufficient, and the action was dismissed.
It seems the court could have held that the directors were not
necessary parties to the action and that a mandatory injunction could
have been granted against the corporation for the declaration of the
27
dividends.
The result of the principal case is commercially sound and conducive
of wholesome conduct of corporate affairs. It is unconscionable that
the majority stockholders of the voting stock could so choose their directors that a minority stockholder could not bring suit to enforce his rights
due to his inability to get personal service of a majority of the widely
scattered board of directors. By such a process, the majority stockholders could control the corporation through the directors almost without restriction.

28
This the courts should not allow.

EDWIN B.

ROBBINS.

Criminal Law-Transportation of Alcoholic Beverages
The Turlington Act' of 1923 made it unlawful in North Carolina to
2
transport intoxicating liquor in any quantity for beverage purposes.
While this act has not been repealed, the Alcoholic Beverage Control
Act3 of 1937 has modified some of its provisions 4 The basic trans27 Clark v. The Henrietta Mills, 219 N. C. 1, 3, 12 S. E. 2d 682, 683 (1941).
The action was, "to have corporate reorganization together with amendments to
the charter of defendant, declared invalid as to plaintiff; to protect plaintiff's rights
to accrued dividends on preferred stock claimed to be unlawfully invalid or defeated by the reorganization; to compel the payment of such dividends prior to
the payment of dividends on reorganization stock; and to restrain defendant from
the prior payment of dividends on any stock until dividends on plaintiff's preferred
stock are first paid." Injunction was granted to preserve and enforce plaintiff's
rights without requiring directors to be joined as defendants, although the question was not raised by the corporation.
" Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F. 2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316
U. S.675 (1942).
'The Turlington Act is now N. C. GEx. STAT. §§18-1-18-30 (1943). It was
intended to make the North Carolina prohibition law conform substantially with
the National Prohibition Act, and in some respects it is more stringent. See
State v. Hickey, 198 N. C. 45, 150 S.E. 615 (1929).
2N. C. GEr. STAT. §18-2 (1943). "No person shall manufacture, sell, barter,
transport, import, export, deliver, furnish, purchase, or possess any intoxicating
liquor except as authorized in this article... "'
'N. C. GawN. STAT. §§18-36-18-62 (1943). The A.B.C. Act was intended to
establish a uniform system of administration and control of the sale of certain
alcoholic beverages in North Carolina. It provides that in counties where an
election has been held and a majority of those voting in the election have expressed themselves in favor of the operation of liquor stores, county A.B.C. stores
may be established and operated under the supervision of the county A.B.C. Board.
For a thorough discussion of the Act see State v. Davis, 214 N. C. 787, 1 S.E.
2d 104 (1939).
'See State v. Barnhardt, 230 N. C. 223, 52 S. E. 2d 904 (1949); State v.
Wilson, 227 N. C. 43, 40 S.E. 2d 449 (1946).

